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2 Images of Reach, Range, and Recognition
Abstract:
There is much critical potential in bringing together the philosophy 
of emotion and the study of international law. Narratives about legitimate 
political and legal authority have tended to either assume that it is possible 
to extricate emotions from political judgement, or to rest upon
uncomplicated (and wholly demystified) assumptions about the legibility
of emotions over time and place. Philosophers interested in emotion have 
regularly grappled with questions concerning an emotion’s reach and
range (insofar that the emotion in question bears an intersubjective 
component), and recognition (comprehensibility) of emotions beyond 
one’s own social and political communities (or even beyond one’s self).
Emotions contain evaluative judgments, and, as such, they strike as 
subjectively involved and image-laden “engagements with the world” (to
quote Robert Solomon’s memorable phrase). Where evaluative
judgements are embedded within the structure of an emotion, we can
expect it to be scripted, at least to an extent, by time and place, which 
raises, in turn, questions of all sorts pertaining to reach, range, and
recognition.
Keywords: philosophy of emotion, law and emotion, international
law, legal philosophy
                                                                  
               
 
        
         
 
   
        
    
      
    
  
     
     
          
    
         
      
       
   
      
          
    
         
 
 
                  
       
             
       
            
      
                
 
                  
   
        
               
   
     
     
            
    
                   
3
“A favourite nineteenth-century way of getting a man to buy a chair was to call it sincere...” 
Randall Jarrell reviewing Russell Lynes’s The Tastemakers,
“Very Graceful Are the Uses of Culture”, Harpers (1954). 
There is much critical potential in bringing together the philosophy 
of emotion and the study of international law.1 Narratives about
legitimate political and legal authority have tended to either assume that
it is possible to extricate emotions from political judgement, or to rest 
upon uncomplicated (and wholly demystified) assumptions about the 
legibility of emotions over time and place. David Hume in Book III of A 
Treatise of Human Nature declared there “is no such passion in human 
minds, as the love of mankind”.2 For Hume, sympathy was stirred by
particularities, and proximity to pain. Such an abstract, and general
category as “mankind” lacked firm associations and was therefore
impossible to grip. Like Hume, philosophers interested in emotion have
regularly grappled with questions concerning an emotion’s reach and 
range, and so too, our ability to recognize the emotions of others (or even 
those belonging to the self), including the emotions of others outside
one’s own social and political spheres. While some psychologists and 
biologists have suggested a certain universal structure for at least a few
‘core’ emotions,3 many, if not all, emotions contain evaluative judgments,4 
and, as such, they strike as subjectively-involved and image-laden 
“engagements with the world” (to quote Robert Solomon’s memorable
phrase).5 Where evaluative judgements are embedded within the structure 
1 An early version of this paper was presented at a panel on “Emotions and International Law”
organized Rebecca Sutton and Anne Saab at the 2018 Law and Society Association Annual
Meeting in Washington, D.C. The panel represented the first meeting of the Law and Emotions
CRN and the International Law and Politics CRN. An unforgettable set of papers were delivered 
by my co-panelists Rebecca Sutton, Anne Saab, Irene Claeys, Ioannis Kalpouzos, and Itamar
Mann on the subject. I thank them for this time together.
2 David Hume, Stuart D. Warner, and Donald W. Livingston, Political Writings (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Pub. Co, 1994).
3 Charles Darwin and Paul Ekman, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals
(London: HarperCollins, 1998); Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson, eds., The Nature of
Emotion: Fundamental Questions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
4 Martha Craven Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, 8th pr
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008); Ronald De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion, Books 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); Robert C. Solomon, Not Passion’s Slave: Emotions and
Choice (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Jenefer Robinson, Deeper than
Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art (Oxford: New York: Clarendon Press; 
Oxford University Press, 2005).
5 Robert C. Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life (Ind: Hackett Pub. 1993).
   
      
    
 
 
        
 
       
      





     
    
  




     
      
     
  
 
          
   
      
             
       
                   
           
     
             
       
              
             
       
     
                  
     
4 Images of Reach, Range, and Recognition
of an emotion, we can expect it to be scripted, at least to an extent, by
time and place, which raises, in turn, questions of all sorts pertaining to 
reach, range, and recognition. 
Talk of emotions tends to remind us about bodies (and the persons, 
lands, and objects with which they are consciously and subconsciously 
attuned), and, at times, as Hume has just done, the absurdity, or 
strangeness at the very least, of highly abstract concepts that appear to do
work in the field of international law. The aim of this chapter is to begin 
mapping a series of images regarding distance, and range within the 
analytical philosophical literature on emotion to see what questions they 
might press on the theories and practices of international law, and on the 
authority of international law. 
To begin in broad register, we might say that the study of
international or transnational law brings to the fore, amongst other 
things, questions of politics, power, distribution, contingency, treaties, 
ownership, and jurisdiction.6 Emotions bring to the study of law 
questions of perception, consciousness, intensity, truthfulness, bodies, 
precarity, relations, desires, and objects.7 Both raise questions of time, 
place, boundaries, and political authority. Pervasive in both disciplines are 
difficult questions concerning the identification and definition of the
object of study (and the distance or time horizon with which to best access 
or understand that object)8, which, in turn, raise questions about one’s
research methods and aims.
6 James Crawford, Martti Koskenniemi, and Surabi Ranganathan, The Cambridge Companion to
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); James Crawford, Brownlie’s
Principles of Public International Law (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019); Jochen
Von Bernstorff, The Battle for International Law: South-North Perspectives on the Decolonization Era
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019); Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh, 
Jurisdiction (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2012).
7 Emily Kidd White, “On Emotions and the Politics of Attention in Judicial Reasoning,” in
Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Legal Reasoning, ed. Amalia Amaya and Maksymilian Del Mar
(London; UK: Hart Publishing, 2020); Emily Kidd White, Emotions in Legal Reasoning, Oxford
Legal Philosophy (Oxford University Press, forthcoming); Susan A. Bandes, ed., The Passions of
Law, Critical America (New York: New York University Press, 1999); John Deigh, Emotions,
Values, and the Law (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Amalia Amaya and
Maksymilian Del Mar, eds., Virtue, Emotion, and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning
(Chicago: Hart Publishing, 2020); Martha Craven Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust,
Shame, and the Law (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2004).
8 Peter Goldie, “Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and Planning,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism 67, no. 1 (2009): 97(10).
                                                                  
 
    
      
    
 
    
 
 




      
       
  
    
   
  
       
   
       
   
   
     
    
         
     
 
                    
           
         
          
       
                  
        
                 
        
                 
        
5
There are several, but at least four, scripts that provide different sorts 
of reasons for studying emotions in the territories of international law. 
These are sketched below, though strict boundaries between them are not 
intended. In many cases, metaphysical, epistemological, and political 
commitments undergird and bridge these pieces in various ways.
Part I: Four Scripts for Studying Emotions in International Law
Law on the Ground
The study of emotions stands to offer a deeper sense of the impact of
international law, which is so often experienced (or borne) far from the 
international courts, treaties, or governance bodies that establish the legal 
regime under examination.9 Studying the emotions that appear integral, 
epiphenomenal, aberrant, or even disruptive to the human practices that 
constitute international law can assist in developing a more critical 
understandings of them and, so too, the ways in which they work to
support, or undermine, the principles, and norms of application they 
profess.10 As illustrated by Rebecca Sutton’s work in this volume
examining emotions in the context of international humanitarian law, the 
study of emotions can provide highly-detailed and layered portraits of 
legal practice.11 When studying how legal officials are applying law at the 
international or transnational level, or, conversely, how international law
is implemented on the local level12, we might - for example - think it is
important to know something about the impact of emotions on
9 See e.g. Pankaj Mishra, Age of Anger: A History of the Present, First American edition (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017); Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law:
Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011), doi:10.1017/CBO9781139048200; José E. Alvarez, The Impact of International
Organizations on International Law (Leiden ; Boston: Brill/Nijhoff, 2017).
10 Terry A. Maroney, “Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field.,”
Law and Human Behavior 30, no. 2 (2006): 119–42, doi:10.1007/s10979-006-9029-9.
11 See e.g. Rebecca Sutton’s chapter in this volume, “How the emotions and perceptual
judgments of frontline actors shape the practice of International Humanitarian Law”.
12 See e.g. Megiddo, Tamar, “The Domestic Standing of International Law: A Non-State
Account,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 57 (2019): 494.
   
   
       
     
    
     
     
    
     
     
   
    
 
 
    
     
  
         
 
    
           
      
         
 
                
   
                 
             
         
                
                
           
                
           
   
                
    
              
     
                
                 
            
                   
          
              
6 Images of Reach, Range, and Recognition
perceptions and bias,13 the possibilities and politics of empathy,14 the 
disease of conceit, the effects of enmity, and anger on legal reasoning,15 
and/or the consequences of apathy or emotional burn-out on law-making 
or adjudicatory efforts.16 In the field of international criminal law, for
example, we might think it important to engage with work that queries
oversimplified narratives linking trauma and truth-telling to emotional
catharsis.17 The study of emotions broadens, even complicates, our 
understanding of legal actors, 18 bringing to light fundamental questions
from the role of emotions in legal reasoning, to the relationship between
agents and structure, and right down into philosophical conceptions of 
the mind. Conceptualizations and explanations about practical activity, 
motivation, and intention all implicate emotion.
Scholars interested in the impact of an international or transnational 
legal regime (or in political change, historical contingency, and/or
progress and decline narratives) might also wish to study emotions for 
their motivational aspects (Maria Pia Lara, for example, argues that
aesthetic performances such as narratives and protests are more successful
than reasoned dialogue in inspiring new and broader conceptions of social
justice),19 for the ways in which they interact with our political attention,20 
and the ways in which they can pull one’s eye toward (or obscure 
altogether)21 the lived impacts of a legal regime.22 Some emotions
13 Susan A. Bandes, “Remorse and Criminal Justice,” Emotion Review 8, no. 1 (January 2016):
14–19, doi:10.1177/1754073915601222.
14 See e.g. Lawrence Blum, “‘Black Lives Matter’: Moral Frames for Understanding the Police
Killings of Black Males,” in Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning, ed. 
Amalia Amaya and Maksymilian Del Mar (Hart Publishing, 2020).
15 Terry Maroney, “Angry Judges,” Vanderbilt Law Review 65, no. 5 (2012): 1205–86.
16 See e.g. Stina Bergman Blix et al., “Introducing an Interdisciplinary Frontier to Judging,
Emotion and Emotion Work,” Oñati Socio-Legal Series 9, no. 5 (2019): 548–56.
17 See e.g. Sara Kendall and Sarah Nouwen, “Representational Practices at the International
Criminal Court: The Gap Between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood”, 76 Law and
Contemporary Problems (2014), 235-262.
18 See e.g. Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
19 María Pía Lara, Moral Textures: Feminist Narratives in the Public Sphere (Berkeley, Calif.: 
University of California Press, 1998).
20 White, “On Emotions and the Politics of Attention in Judicial Reasoning.”
21 See e.g. Andrea Bianchi and Anne Saab, “Fear and International Law-Making: An
Exploratory Inquiry,” Leiden Journal of International Law 32, no. 3 (September 2019): 351–65.
22 We might here think of the international law projects that aim at generating data-based
visualizations of human rights violations. See, e.g., the “Data Visualization for Human Rights
Project” at the New York University School of Law Center for Human Rights and Global
                                                                  
    
  
    
     
     
 
     
      
     
     
    
  
   
 
   
   
     
   
  
   








                
               
             
             
  
               
 
             
           
           
            
       
             
               
7
precipitate or compound an inability to pay quality attention to other
persons, while other emotions play indispensable roles in fixing and 
holding attention on a subject.23 We might query whether there are 
emotions which spur on law-making processes at the international level
(hope, rage, horror, oblivion)?
Theories of emotion also seem highly pertinent to biographical work 
in the field of international law where the aim is often to sketch something
like a subjective portrait of a pivotal figure, revealing perhaps something
new about the relationship between personality, historical context, action,
intention and consequence. For such work, a theory of mind,24 and 
emotion is always at play, however buried, and it invariably includes ideas 
and claims about how conscious one might be of their own emotions, 
and/or those of others.25 The study of emotion seems similarly relevant for 
research efforts that examine the impact of certain immaterial forces such 
as the zeitgeist, or the mood of an age, or era (political crises for example 
often seem to suggest something of an emotional high-pitch, and/or an 
everything-is-illuminated visceral sense of certain stakes, which might be
revealing, illusory, or entirely obscuring of other less visceral, or 
attention-grabbing, instances of structural political violence, 
environmental degradation, etc.).
Justice. Online at https://chrgj.org/focus-areas/data-visualization-for-human-rights/
23 White, “On Emotions and the Politics of Attention in Judicial Reasoning.”
24 See e.g. G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, 2nd ed (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2000); David John Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, 1. issued as
an Oxford University Press paperback, Philosophy of Mind Series (New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1997).
25 See e.g. Maria Aristodemou, Law and Psychoanalysis: Taking the Unconscious Seriously
(Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2014); Maria Aristodemou, “A Constant 
Craving for Fresh Brains and a Taste for Decaffeinated Neighbours,” European Journal of
International Law 25, no. 1 (February 1, 2014): 35–58, doi:10.1093/ejil/cht080; Alan W. Norrie,
Law and the Beautiful Soul (London ; Portland, Or. : Portland, Or: GlassHouse ; Published in the
United States by Cavendish Pub, 2005); Alan Norrie, “Animals Who Think and Love: Law,
Identification and the Moral Psychology of Guilt,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 13, no. 3 
(September 2019): 515–44. See also, Robert Lowell, “Dolphin” “My eyes saw what my hand did”
Selected Poems by Robert Lowell, published by Farrar, Straus & Giroux, Inc. 1976, 1977.
   
 
    
 
    
   
    
     
     
     
   
   
  
 
        
  
      
       
       
     
 
   
    
   
      
 
                   
         
          
              
      
        
                
               
  
                   
    
                 
        
           
   
                
     
               
8 Images of Reach, Range, and Recognition
Legal Reasoning/Legal Interpretation
Research into the forms and practices of legal reasoning and
interpretation are similarly enriched by the study of emotion.26 It is 
evident, for example, that legal texts sometimes involve emotion words27 
(the search for remorse in sentencing28, the hate in hate speech29), or 
evaluative legal terms that have emotional resonances, such as equality, 
freedom, or dignity.30 We might ask how the hermeneutics of various
international legal regimes differ, and how this relates to the roles that 
emotions play in the various practices of interpreting evaluative legal 
concepts?
Alternatively, one might also be interested in the emotional aspects of 
the materials that form part of the legal judgements, that are embedded 
within or invoked via the text of the judgement, i.e., the recitation of the 
facts, the woven-in metaphors,31 the use of past cases as analogies, the use
of hypotheticals and exemplars,32 and the judgements overall style (or lack 
thereof) or prose. Or, one might wish to focus on the emotional aspects 
of the evidence or testimony that forms part of the legal record, and how 
these – perhaps even alongside the performances of the legal actors,33 or 
the aesthetics of the court room, impact legal reasoning. It seems an
important question to determine how the law may or may not be able to 
bear (or even bear witness to) some of these emotional materials.34 One 
26 See Amaya and Del Mar, Virtue, Emotion, and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning.
27 Maroney, “Law and Emotion.”
28 Bandes, “Remorse and Criminal Justice.”
29 See Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 2009
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012). See also, Saskatchewan (Human Rights
Commission) v. Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467.l
30 White, Emotions in Legal Reasoning. See, also, Tarunabh Khaitan, “Dignity as an Expressive
Norm: Neither Vacuous Nor a Panacea,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 32, no. 1 (March 1,
2012): 1–19.
31 See Maksymilian Del Mar, Artefacts of Legal Inquiry: The Value of Imagination in Adjudication
(Oxford; New York: Hart, 2020).
32 See Maksymilian Del Mar, “Exemplarity and Narrativity in the Common Law Tradition,”
Law and Literature 25, no. 3 (November 2013): 390–427, doi:10.1525/lal.2013.25.3.390;
Maksymilian Del Mar and William Twining, Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice, (Cham: 
Springer International Publishing, 2015).
33 See e.g. Stina Bergman Blix and Åsa Wettergren, Professional Emotions in Court: A
Sociological Perspective, 1 Edition (New York: Routledge, 2019).
34 Sara Kendall and Sarah Nouwen, “Representational Practices at the International Criminal
                                                                  
    
    
     
  
   
      
           
  
     
  
     
    
    





       
    
 
    
      
       
  
   
     
     
 
            
          
            
  
              
              
            
            
         
             
 
9
significant site for exploration lies in the emotions of claimants reacting
to what they see as the violence of state action and to what they or their 
lawyers might frame as a rights violation. Claimants may have such 
emotions as humiliation,35 rage, grief, indignation, and sorrow. The law 
has a language and a process. The emotions of claimants are mediated 
through laws of evidence and civil procedure. Legal processes take time.
Lawyers work to reflect the humiliation, rage, grief, and sorrow of their 
clients by building a case that is recognizable by the court – a case that 
fits coherently into a line of precedent. This can be empowering.36 It can 
also be debilitating. It is critical to acknowledge the inexpressibility of 
some anguish and the inconsequence of legal remedy for some harms or 
wrongs.37 It is also necessary to acknowledge the conservative nature of
precedent, which tends to disregard those forms of harm, injury, social
exclusion, or discrimination that appear to fall outside the recognized 
categories of legal rights violations. 
Foundations/Grounds
A distinct set of reasons to study emotions in international law
concerns the search for a common – or at least, solid - structure of human 
experience or human nature with which to establish a ground for 
critiquing existing political or legal arrangements. In the history of liberal 
political philosophy, emotions have long been a potential ground for 
constructing a theory of human nature which serves as a foundation for
constructing arguments about legitimate political authority. We might
think here of Hobbes building a political system out of a common fear of 
death, and a desire for commodious living.38 Or Hume who grounded
ethical activity in the shared sentiment of beneficence, to argue (in
Court: The Gap between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood.(The Practices of the International
Criminal Court),” Law and Contemporary Problems 76, no. 3–4 (2013): 235; Hannah Arendt,
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Penguin Classics (New York, N.Y: 
Penguin Books, 2006).
35 See Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996).
36 Patricia Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1992).
37 I thank Megan Donaldson for raising this question. See e.g. Raimond Gaita, “On Dignity,”
in Philosophy, Ethics and a Common Humanity: Essays in Honour of Raimond Gaita, ed. 
Christopher Cordner (New York: Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2017).
38 Thomas Hobbes and Crawford B. Macpherson, Leviathan, Repr, Penguin Classics
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1988).
   
    
     
     
     
      
   
    
   
 
       
     
     
   
     
 
  
     
  
   
  
     
    
        
   
    
      







           
                    
 
             
    
10 Images of Reach, Range, and Recognition
something akin to an early critical genealogy) that justice was an artificial 
virtue that developed over time via the co-mingling of an ingrained sense
of justice and a series of historically contingent community practices 
concerning property.39 Or we might think of Robin West writing in the 
1989 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism that we should scrap much of 
everything to do with existing legal systems and begin again by 
constructing a feminist legal theory sourced directly from the emotions
of love and rage.40 
Normative arguments in legal and political thinking regularly
smuggle into their premise’s conceptions of human nature, and or human 
personality.41 Studying the assumptions at play about emotions in an 
argument about the authority of international law can further the critical
work of unpacking its often-unspoken presumptions and premises.
Human nature arguments can run in various directions claiming, for 
example, that certain political arrangements are necessary to enable or 
support human security, or human flourishing, to cure the hard-wired ills 
of human nature, or to prevent distortions in human personality (or, more 
subtlety, construct the possibilities for human personality). This is an old 
model of political argumentation that has seen explicit renewal in
invocations of international human rights and human dignity. Probing 
the conception of emotion embedded within a theory about the political 
authority or legitimacy of governance activity beyond the state level can
work to expose the broader working account of human nature (or other
sorts of foundational claims about what human beings are like) that is
often doing a lot of work in sustaining the overall argument. Set to light, 
such accounts can then be accepted, modified, or rejected at the level of 
detail or of form.
39 Hume, Warner, and Livingston, Political Writings.
40 Robin West, “Love, Rage and Legal Theory,” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1, no. 1 
(1989): 101–10.
41 Christopher J. Berry, Human Nature, Issues in Political Theory (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press International, 1986).
                                                                  
     
 
   
    
     
       
    
  
   
     
      
    
    
 
    
 
     
   
   
   
  
        
 
                          
           
              
       
            
     
               
         
      
            
         
        
                 
       
 
                
        
 
   
11
The Politics of Sensibility
A fourth script envisions the study of emotions in international law as
a facet of an interest in sensibility, style42, aesthetics, or phenomenology, 
with proponents working through the ways in which emotions are
shaped – or mutually constituted by political culture, by law, history and 
language, and/or deeper material realities/political economies.43 Work 
here might detail the emotional sensibility already demanded by the 
international laws that are in force in a particular place (even if that 
sensibility appears to be a cold, clinical one) by describing it, analyzing it, 
historicizing it, and/or by drawing attention to its material base. In the 
alternative, work in this area might focus on establishing (coaxing out, 
rediscovering, giving due regard etc. to that which has been politically 
marginalized) an alternative political sensibility, of solidarity for example,
as a form of reaction or resistance.44 Here we might think of work
unpacking the emotional architecture of a legal meeting, of jurisdictional 
overlap,45 or of a treaty.46 The study of emotion seems pertinent to those 
who are working to recover and call attention to those sensibilities
towards international law or governance that have been long ignored or 
actively dismissed or dismantled. In this vein, we see powerful work 
emerging in the histories of international law and the field of international 
law and literature,47 which draws in work on the expressive or affective
42 As Randall Jarrell said of style, it “ought to make it easy for you to say all the you have to
say, not, as most do, make it impossible for you to get free from one narrowed range of 
experience and expression.” “The Humble Animal”, Jarrell, Poetry and the Age (London: Faber, 
1996) at 158. See also, Gerry Simpson, The Sentimental Life of International Law: Literature,
Language and Longing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).
43 See, e.g., Illan rua Wall, “The Ordinary Affects of Law,” Law, Culture and the Humanities,
November 16, 2019, 174387211988650, doi:10.1177/1743872119886509.
44 See e.g. John Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism (Toronto; Buffalo; London:
University of Toronto Press, 2016). Jessie Hohmann, ed., International Law’s Objects, First Edition
(Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2018). Mishra, Age of Anger. Gerry
Simpson has been doing something like this in a piece called “gardening instead”. 
45 See John Borrows, “Indian Agency: Forming First Nations Law in Canada,” Political and
Legal Anthropology Review 24, no. 2 (2001): 9–24, doi:10.1525/pol.2001.24.2.9.
46 See e.g. Ruth Buchanan and Jeffery G Hewitt, “Treaty Canoe,” in International Law’s Objects,
edited by Jessie Hohmanm and Daniel Joyce (Oxford University Press, 2018), 491–503,
doi:10.1093/oso/9780198798200.003.0042.
47 See e.g. the workshop series, “Literature and International Law: at the edge” convened by
Joseph Slaughter (Columbia University), Vasuki Nesiah (New York University), Gerry Simpson
(London School of Economics) and Christopher Gevers (University of KwaZulu-Natal).
Website: https://www.il-lit.org
   
      
    
    
  
       
      













                  
        
       
   
 
                 
     
    
        
          
           
           
         
          
       
                 
             
   
                 
      
                 
             
       
               
            
     
                 
              
12 Images of Reach, Range, and Recognition
content48 of international law.49 There are also emotion-rich histories of 
international law,50 and from a different angle much emerging work on
the history of emotions, and the history of emotions in law,51 which aim
to offer highly specific and detailed portraits of emotions in a snapshot of
legal time.52 If emotions are well understood as bound up with ways of 
seeing, relating, being in the world, then perhaps work in the field of 
international law that probes broader historical-materialist planes might 
wish to think of the emotions that were made possible (or impossible) in
various epochs, eras, or periods of time.53 
48 See e.g. Mark A. Drumbl, “Memorializing Dissent: Justice Pal in Tokyo,” AJIL Unbound 114 
(2020): 111–16, doi:10.1017/aju.2020.26; Vidya Kumar, “Revolutionaries,” in Concepts for
International Law: Contributions to Disciplinary Thought, ed. Jean D’Aspremont and Sahib Singh 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019); Joseph R. Slaughter, Human Rights, Inc.
(Fordham University Press, 2007), doi:10.5422/fordham/9780823228171.001.0001.
49 See e.g. Kamari Maxine Clarke, Affective Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Pan-
Africanist Pushback (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019); Fleur Johns, The Non-Legal in
International Law: Unruly Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
doi:10.1017/CBO9781139012959; Immi Tallgren and Thomas Skouteris, eds., The New Histories
of International Criminal Law: Retrials, History and Theory of International Law (Oxford, United
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2019); Gerry Simpson, “The Sentimental Life of
International Law,” London Review of International Law 3, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 3–29,
doi:10.1093/lril/lru013; Naz K. Modirzadeh, “Cut These Words: Passion and International Law
of War Scholarship,” Harvard International Law Journal 61, no. 1 (2020),
doi:10.2139/ssrn.3485822; Wall, “The Ordinary Affects of Law.”
50 As Nietzsche wrote in The Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life, the living man
uses history in three ways: for sources of grand companions and intensity; for finding loyalty,
sentiment, belonging; and for collecting fire-fuel, bodies for bloodlettings (criticism).
51 See e.g. Kathryn Temple, Loving Justice: Legal Emotions in William Blackstone’s England (New
York: New York University Press, 2019).
52 See e.g. Sandra Schnädelbach, “The Voice Is the Message: Emotional Practices and Court
Rhetoric in Early Twentieth Century Germany,” Oñati Socio-Legal Series 9, no. 9(5) (December
1, 2019): 616–35, doi:10.35295/osls.iisl/0000-0000-0000-1030. Also, more generally, see the 
work at the Center for the History of Emotions at Max Planck Institute for Human
Development (Berlin, Germany) and the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for
the History of Emotions (The University of Western Australia).
53 See e.g. Hila Keren’s writing on neoliberal emotions in “Valuing Emotions” Wake Forest
Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 5, 2018; Southwestern Law School Research Paper No. 2019/02.
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Part II: Post-Script Questions - Conceptualizing Reach, Range
and Recognition in the Study of Emotions
…what scaffolded mind
Can rebuild experience
Philip Larkin, “A Stone Church Damaged 
by a Bomb”54 
As the above section aims to show, there are several reasons why those 
studying international law might be interested in emotion. With respect
to each of the above scripts, it will be important to consider how one is 
conceptualizing the reach, range, and recognition of emotions over time 
and place, including our ability to study emotions, our aptitude for
recognizing our own emotions, and those of others, and any underlying 
assumptions about the relationship of emotions to knowledge claims.
While some aspects of an emotion might appear to have universal 
features,55 a great deal often turns on the relation between a specific
emotion and the context in which it is embedded. Emotions involve a 
physiological aspect (a pain or pleasure), and a judgment or evaluation of
importance.56 Affectivity, understood as the experience of pain and 
pleasure, differentiates emotions from other modes of thought or
experience.57 Some of the pains and pleasures relevant to emotions are of
a particular sort: they are evaluative in the sense that they pick out and 
respond to features of the environment that the agent considers
54 Philip Larkin and Archie Burnett, The Complete Poems, 1. American paperback ed (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013).
55 . . Some psychologists have shown how anger flashes across faces in a similar manner in cross-
cultural studies, with a widening of the eyes and a tight-jawed bearing of the teeth. See e.g. Paul
Ekman, Universals and Cultural Differences in Facial Expressions of Emotion (University of
Nebraska Press Lincoln, 1971), Paul Ekman, 'Facial Expression and Emotion', American
Psychologist, 48/4 (1993), 384, Paul Ekman, Darwin and Facial Expression: A Century of Research in
Review (Malor Books, 2006). Charles Darwin, The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965). Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion,
Reason, and the Human Brain (London: Penguin, 2005) xxiii, 312 p. Joseph E. Ledoux, The
Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1996) 384 p.
56 John Gardner, “The Logic of Excuses and the Rationality of Emotions,” Journal of Value
Inquiry 43, 315–338 (2009); Solomon, The Passions.
57 Robinson, Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art.
   
          
      
  
   
  
   
       
       
     
 
       
  
     
  
 
      
 
       
    
   
      
      
      
    
      
    
   
 
             
              
        
            
           
      
           
                 
 
                
         
            
    
14 Images of Reach, Range, and Recognition
important.58 As Michael Stocker writes, “there is far more to emotions
than what is bodily…(and) this ‘more’ involves thoughts desires and 
values or evaluations.”59 Where evaluative judgements are embedded 
within the structure of an emotion, we can expect it to be scripted, at least 
to an extent, by time and place (shaped by political and material realities,
and prone to drawing on idiom, norms, caches of images, binaries, myths, 
etc. - and with all of this extending even to one’s experience and 
description of the physiological aspects of emotions).60 This raises, in turn, 
questions of all sorts pertaining to the reach, range, and recognition of 
emotions between persons and groups, and these over space and time.61 
This final section of the chapter poses two sets of questions raised by the 
literature on the philosophy of emotion to suggest that how one sets about 
to examine emotions in the territories of international law will largely 
depend on the answers to them that are either assumed or given.
Questions of reach, questions of capture
The first set of questions is already raised by the exercise of writing
about emotions. What about emotions is it possible to capture through 
writing and study? What about emotions is it possible to capture in the 
study of law, or international law? There is a memorable scene in Mihail
Sebastian’s novel Two Thousand Years62 where the protagonist, a young
scholar, passes a political march with his friend who is seized by the energy
and expression of the crowd before seamlessly joining in. The protagonist 
also wishes to feel the hot, joyful solidarity of the gathering but finds
himself invariably stuck outside the moment, watching himself as an
external observer, analyzing the experience, feeling a heavy distance.63 
58 White, Emotions in Legal Reasoning; Solomon, The Passions; Robinson, Deeper than Reason.
59 Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hegeman, Valuing Emotions, Cambridge Studies in
Philosophy (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
60 Solomon, Not Passion’s Slave; Solomon, The Passions; Robinson, Deeper than Reason; Bernard
Arthur Owen Williams, Shame and Necessity, New ed, Sather Classical Lectures 57 (Berkeley,
Calif.: University of California Press, 2008).
61 See e.g. Williams, Shame and Necessity.
62 Mihail Sebastian and Seán Ó Ceallaigh, For Two Thousand Years, Penguin Modern Classics
(UK: Penguin Books, 2016).
63 Nietzsche writing about the Ancient Greeks famously mourns the impossibility of
absorption, which is something akin to a full-blooded, un-self-conscious, unironic engagement,
in modern thinking in Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of
History for Life (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1980).
                                                                  
    
    
   
       
   
    
     
    
      
       
     
  
 
     
     
     
 
      
    
    
   
 
                    
       
               
             
        
 
          
 
               
       
  
          
              
           
       
           
       
               
     
         
                  
       
           
15
The scene raises the question as to whether an emotional state might be
capturable or cognizable from an outside perspective?64 How might the
answer to this question change were we to understand emotions to reflect 
a politics,65 a political time,66 an ethics67 and/or a way of seeing?68 All of
these questions engage deep epistemological questions about the 
relationship between emotions and understanding. Bernard Williams
notably raised similar questions in his book, Shame and Necessity,69 which 
considers whether and how the “modern” western reader might grasp
ancient Greek tragedies and understand their daemonic worldview
conceptions of necessity and shame vis-à-vis post-Kantian and Christian
conceptions of autonomy and guilt, imbued as they are with disparate 
social and moral landscapes and metaphysical assumptions.
A related background question concerns whether the research and 
study of emotions alters them? Can research methods grasp their subject, 
“pinned and wriggling on the wall”?70 One criticism of the law and 
emotions field is the tendency to offer overly rationalized descriptions of 
emotions (often casting emotions just like other forms of reasons for
action) in order to render them more recognizable to the subject of law, 
and/or legal reasoning.71 Questions remain, however, as to whether
emotions have something like an elusive quality, and whether they are 
64 We might think here of how calls for solidarity in social movements can sometimes leave
academics feeling impotent, removed, wrong-tooled or heavy-footed. Or of Philip Larkin 
writing about the end of love: “Standing on love’s further shore” as Larkin coolly put it in his
poem, “Prologue”. Or see Sigrid Nunez in the New York Review of Books for a discussion on
Garth Greenwell’s novels and the trickiness of writing about sex in fiction boiling down to the
fact that absent a state of arousal much of the language to describe sexual activity appears staid,
hackneyed, and ridiculous. Sigrid Nunez, “Sex and Sincerity,” The New York Review of Books,
June 11, 2020.
65 Amia Srinivasan, “The Aptness of Anger,” Journal of Political Philosophy 26, no. 2 (June
2018): 123–44; Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Berkeley, Calif: Crossing Press, 
c2007, n.d.).
66 See Mishra, Age of Anger.
67 On emotions as the foundation of ethics, see Hume, Warner, and Livingston, Political
Writings; Charles Leslie Stevenson, “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Term,” Mind XLVI, no.
181 (1937): 14–31, doi:10.1093/mind/XLVI.181.14; Solomon, The Passions; Jesse Prinz, “The
Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments,” Philosophical Explorations 9, no. 1 (March 2006): 29–43; 
Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals (Oxford University Press, 2009).
68 Jean-Paul Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, Reprint, Routledge Classics (London: 
Routledge, 2006); Solomon, The Passions.
69 Williams, Shame and Necessity.
70 “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” in Thomas Stearns Eliot, Collected Poems, 1909-1962,
Centenary ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991).
71 White, Emotions in Legal Reasoning.
   
      
        
   
 
       
        
        
   
         
 
    
   
   
      
 
       
  
  
   
   
     
       
       
    
     
    
 
              
             
                  
    
              
               
 
             
          
          
          
          
               
            
    
16 Images of Reach, Range, and Recognition
well understood by the self? 72 We might ask in what ways are emotions 
private?73 Stephen Leighton holds the view that the feeling aspects of 
emotions are private, writing that:
(s)erious discussion of feelings is made difficult because feelings, whatever
their precise nature and role, occupy a particularly private part of our psychic
life…(s)ince these difficulties are inherent in the subject matter, we can never
enjoy the sort of sophistication in discrimination or comparison concerning 
feelings which we enjoy with, say, the cognitive components of emotion.74 
Further on the subject of capture, we might ask whether we can study
the emotions of legal actors by reference to legal documents, evidentiary 
records, legislative speeches,75 judgements?76 If so, are we studying the
emotions of these legal actors, or the expression (even performance) of 
their emotions, the quality of their speech, writing, prose, or something
else?77 What of documents written in concert? Or of legal judgements
aiming to capture the ear of the public, or to escape the eye of an appellate 
court? How and when does legal language reveal emotion?78 Whose 
emotions? Philosophers of emotion have long puzzled through questions
about emotions and time (often assumptions about the expected duration 
of an emotion, for good or ill, serve as stamps of authentication, i.e., is it
grief without the long drift, anger without flint, love if it retreats in the 
cold morning light?).79 And so too, how emotions change when we fold 
experiences, including emotional experiences into narratives – drawing
in patterns, and political histories (for example, an incident which
frightened us, might upon reflection raise laughter, indignation, or 
72 See e.g. Aristodemou, Law and Psychoanalysis; Aristodemou, “A Constant Craving for Fresh
Brains and a Taste for Decaffeinated Neighbours”; Norrie, “Animals Who Think and Love.”
73 See e.g. Stephen R. Leighton, “A New View of Emotion,” American Philosophical Quarterly
22, no. 2 (1985): 133–41.
74 Leighton, Philosophy and the Emotions: A Reader at 276.
75 Carol Sanger, “Legislating with Affect: Emotion and Legislative Law Making,” Nomos 53 
(2013): 38–76.
76 See White, Emotions in Legal Reasoning. Maroney, “Law and Emotion.”
77 On the performance of emotion in the courtroom, see Blix and Wettergren, Professional
Emotions in Court; Stina Bergman Blix and Åsa Wettergren, “A Sociological Perspective on
Emotions in the Judiciary,” Emotion Review 8, no. 1 (January 2016): 32–37.
78 See Maroney, “Law and Emotion.”
79 Goldie, “Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and Planning”; Leighton, Stephen R., “A New 
View of Emotion,” American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985); White, “On Emotions and the
Politics of Attention in Judicial Reasoning.”
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rage).80 On the subject of time, law and emotion, Susan Bandes has
written of how the emotion of remorse implicates something of a future 
gaze, and a promise of better behaviour, finding, devastatingly, that 
judges are often less apt at reading a concrete future (full of family, success,
education, etc.) for poor and/or racialized defendants, and hence are less 
likely to attribute to them the emotion of remorse, a factor which has
concrete consequences in terms of sentencing.81 
There are also questions concerning the formality, and highly
structured nature of legal writing and reasoning.82 What is the assumed 
relationship between sincerity and form?83 There is a difference between 
chronicling emotions and experiencing emotions.84 There is a difference 
between using emotion words, like guilt and love, and experiencing 
either of these things.85 How wide’s the chasm? These questions are 
relevant when we think of studying the emotions that get translated (or 
transmuted) through the rules of evidence, and testimony, the norms of 
judgement writing, and through legal language, and legal concepts of 
law, which themselves often contain emotional and expressive content.86 
Some philosophers of emotion have attempted to make sense of these
distinctions by insisting that emotions have physiological components.87 
One might, for example, hold the particular set of evaluative judgments 
that are characteristic of an emotion but might not be considered to be 
experiencing that emotion where they lack its characteristic feeling or 
80 White, “On Emotions and the Politics of Attention in Judicial Reasoning”; Goldie,
“Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and Planning.”
81 Susan A. Bandes, “Remorse and Demeanor in the Courtroom: Cognitive Science and the
Evaluation of Contrition,” in About the Integrity of Criminal Process: From Theory into Practice, 1st
ed. (Hart Publishing, 2016).
82 See Amaya and Del Mar, Virtue, Emotion, and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning; Del 
Mar, “Exemplarity and Narrativity in the Common Law Tradition.”
83 Goldie, “Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and Planning.” Also, W.H. Auden on form,
paraphrasing Paul Valéry: "a person is a poet if his imagination is stimulated by the difficulties
inherent in his art and not if his imagination is dulled by them." “W. H. Auden, The Art of
Poetry No. 17,” The Paris Review, Spring 1974, 
https://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/3970/the-art-of-poetry-no-17-w-h-auden.
84 White, “On Emotions and the Politics of Attention in Judicial Reasoning.”
85 White, Emotions in Legal Reasoning.
86 See Khaitan, “Dignity as an Expressive Norm”; White, Emotions in Legal Reasoning;
Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity.
87 Robinson, Deeper than Reason; De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion; Solomon, The Passions.
   
    
     
    
         
       
     
    
      
     
     
    
 
      
    
      
       
  
 
     
 
    
  
   
  
   
 
   
   
    
 
 
              
     
       
              
       
          
                 
                 
             
          
18 Images of Reach, Range, and Recognition
physiological aspect.88 Aristotle argued that the emotion of anger followed 
from the recognition that a slight towards oneself or one’s friends had
occurred. One might, however, understand perfectly well that they’ve
been slighted and yet feel nothing. Should they be described as angry? 
What if they use the judgment as a reason for action, or play up the role? 
What if the physiological aspects of the emotion lag, or are repressed, or 
projected? A common error is to assume that emotions or emotional 
reactions occur only in extreme states or are detectable only in
overwrought descriptions.89 Combatting the idea that emotional reactions
were always over-reactions, and/or the source of undisciplined, specious
reasoning, there’s John Gardner’s memorable lines:
there is no general or default answer to the question of whether a sober 
appreciation of reasons for action is more reasonable than an emotionally-
charged appreciation of those same reasons for action. Being cool, calm, and 
collected is just another place on the emotional map, with no special claim to 
rational efficiency.90 
Questions of recognition and range
The above set of questions concerned what might be possible to
capture and study about emotions in the theory and practice of 
international law. This second series of questions concerns the 
recognition of others, including the emotions of others, through 
emotions themselves. Which emotions, for example, facilitate 
recognition, respect, justice, dignity, solidarity? Under which 
circumstances? How might we conceptualize or examine one’s range of 
emotional concern? Or the politics and quality of that emotional concern? 
Or the barriers to emotional concern?91 
88 Leighton, Stephen R., “A New View of Emotion.”
89 Israel Scheffler makes a similar argument in a short essay entitled “Ten Myths about 
Metaphor,” in Israel Scheffler, In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions (London: Routledge, 1991). See, 
e.g. how the controlled prose of modern poetry can strike as utterly devastating, as in “One Art”
in Elizabeth Bishop, The Complete Poems 1926-1979 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1983). See also Randall Jarrell, Poetry and the Age (London: Faber, 1955) 240.
90 Gardner, 'The Logic of Excuses and the Rationality of Emotions', at 349.
91 See e.g. Lawrence Blum, “‘Black Lives Matter’: Moral Frames for Understanding the Police
Killings of Black Males,” in Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning, ed. 
Amalia Amaya and Maksymilian Del Mar (Hart Publishing, 2020), 121–38.
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Ilya Kaminsky’s Deaf Republic92 is an epic series of poems about a 
fictionalized town under occupation whose people take up deafness
(conceptualized as a meaning-rich, power-filled refusal of sound, not a 
lack) as a political mode of resistance. In an early poem, entitled,
“Deafness, an insurgency begins”, a member of an occupying force barks
orders at a citizen, who raises her finger to point at her ear, signalling a 
message not received, a refusal. The image is of incommensurability as 
resistance, a communication blockade. In a later poem this stance comes 
to feel like a ‘natural’ or spontaneous response to many of the townspeople
living under the occupation. This book of poems, amongst other things,
raises questions about the role emotions play in the political recognition 
of others as equals.
Robert Solomon describes some emotions as having an intersubjective
focus, meaning that they aim at an understanding that sits, in a sense, 
somewhere between the person experiencing the emotion and its 
subject.93 Solomon offers pity as an example of such an emotion, and uses
this criterion of intersubjectivity to illustrate how ill-versions of the
emotion might arise. If the focus of pity, for example, moves too close to
the self and away from its subject, it risks becoming narcissistic and/or 
self-indulgent. If it moves too far away from the self, the suffering of
another might fail to register as it should or might have, causing one, at 
times, to be obtuse, heedless, hard-hearted, or cruel.94 This view echoes in 
John Berger’s ‘Photographs of Agony’, though it is cast there in explicitly 
political terms.95 Berger writes how the mind can move inwards to wrestle 
with questions of moral inadequacy after witnessing a photograph 
depicting anguish or horror, in a process that effectively transmutes the 
reality of the other into a private, general and abstract, existential question
that remains far removed from the concrete political realities that 
precipitated the war, the attack, the mass drowning, the famine, etc.
Where, for Berger, the angst felt by the witness does result in action, it is 
92 Ilya Kaminsky, Deaf Republic: Poems (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Graywolf Press, 2019).
93 Solomon, Not Passion’s Slave.
94 Where the affective component of pain and concern is traded for pleasure, the suffering of
others could result in gawking or titillation. See White, Emotions in Legal Reasoning.
95 John Berger et al., Ways of Seeing (London: Penguin Books, 2008).
   
   
       
 
 
     
  
       
    
     
 
        
       
   





     







                  
            
           
                   
                  
     
               
      
                 
   
                  
            
        
                  
 
          
20 Images of Reach, Range, and Recognition
invariably token if it is aimed at relieving their internal discomfort as 
opposed to a move towards political recognition, or an act of
confrontation or resistance. 
Sociologists of punishment have long written about witnessing pain
without experiencing pain.96 Must, for example, a recognition of kinship 
or equality always precede the “sharing of another’s pain,” or might the
witnessing of another’s pain instigate and/or facilitate this recognition of 
kinship or equality. This is a critical sequencing question. Lynn Hunt has 
argued the latter position, suggesting that, over time, literary depictions 
of pain and suffering have worked to generate more inclusive conceptions
of justice through empathy.97 Hans Joas resists this view by using historical
examples to illustrate how the pain of “the other” remained unseen and 
un-affecting prior to the recognition that they were sacred or equal.98
While these views needn’t be mutually exclusive, the productive potential 
of emotions like empathy in the law rests on the sequencing of pain and 
recognition that the emotion is presumed to entail.99 
At times, painful emotions serve epistemic functions, aiding our
understanding of the situation we are confronting.100 Pain, up to a point, 
can facilitate focus and attention. In this way, it has the potential to be 
clarifying, just as anger can be a form of right-seeing.101 All emotions have 
a built-in desire, and painful emotions have a built-in desire to locate the 
source of the pain.102 Emotional reactions, such as horror, indignation, or
political anger,103can also serve to highlight the hypocritical nature of a 
96 David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory, Studies in Crime
and Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish:
The Birth of the Prison, 2nd Vintage Books ed (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
97 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2007).
98 Hans Joas, The Sacredness of the Person: A New Genealogy of Human Rights (Washington, 
D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2013).
99 White, Emotions in Legal Reasoning; Emily Kidd White, “Till Human Voices Wake Us,”
Journal of Law, Religion and State 3 (2014): 201.
100 Michael S. Brady, Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience (Oxford
University Press, 2013).
101 Srinivasan, “The Aptness of Anger.” See also, Catherine Z Elgin, “Impartiality and Legal
Reasoning,” in Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning, ed. Amalia Amaya
and Maksymilian Del Mar (Hart Publishing, 2020), doi:10.5040/9781509925162.
102 Solomon, Not Passion’s Slave. Gardner, “The Logic of Excuses and the Rationality of
Emotions.”
103 Srinivasan, “The Aptness of Anger.”
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legal order by juxtaposing the impact of a law’s publicly stated purpose,
against its impact.104 The attention-directing features of emotions are far 
from apolitical, and raise a series of questions about whose emotions are 
legible to those in power, and whose emotions are perceived to be 
legitimate, compound, deeply-felt, or authentic.105 
In a different but related vein we might worry about the arrogance
(one that seems easily compounded by racist, classist, or gendered 
stereotypes) in assuming the legibility of the emotions of others over time 
and place. Iris Murdoch has written powerfully on the need to generate 
new ethical concepts that respect the gravity and complexity of the 
other.106 Murdoch writes:
we derive from Kant, and also Hobbes and Bentham through John Smart Mill,
a picture of the individual as a free rational will. With the removal of Kant’s 
metaphysical background this individual is seen as alone. (He is in a certain
sense alone on Kant’s view also, that is: not confronted with real dissimilar
others.)107
Elsewhere I have written about the error of empathy that occurs
where legal actors, operating under the assumption that there are no deep 
or difficult to access differences between persons and how they experience
the law, imagine themselves into the legal and/or social position of the 
claimant in a manner which serves to co-opt their stories and experiences 
into a pre-existing narrative.108 In earlier writings, I’ve drawn on the work
of Simone Weil to illustrate how pain experienced by others might be
erased, or found to be titillating. Others have detailed how empathy is 
often highly selective, frequently moralized, and dependent upon (often 
highly problematic) notions of desert and agency, and much has been 
written on the ways in which racist, classist, and gendered prejudices and 
stereotypes can foreclose the possibility of empathy. 109 
104 See e.g. Patricia J. Williams, “The Raw and the Half-Cooked,” in The Humanities and Public
Life, ed. Peter Brooks and Hilary Jewett, First edition (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2014).
105 Bandes, “Remorse and Criminal Justice.”
106 Iris. Murdoch, “Against Dryness: A Polemical Sketch,” Encounter, 1961; Iris. Murdoch, 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 1st American ed. (New York: The Penguin Press, 1993).
107 Murdoch, “Against Dryness: A Polemical Sketch.”
108 White, “On Emotions and the Politics of Attention in Judicial Reasoning.”
109 Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie, eds., Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives
   
 
     
      
   
    
      
      
   
      
     
   
   
     
   
   
 
 
    
  
     
   
   
    
 
  
   
  
    
   
    
 
   
            
     
   
        
              
          
22 Images of Reach, Range, and Recognition
The unforgettable lyrical prelude to Kaminsky’s book of poems is
entitled, We Lived Happily During the War (“And when they bombed 
other people’s houses, we/protested/ but not enough, we opposed them 
but not enough… in the street of money in the city of money in the 
country of money/our great country of money, we (forgive us)/lived 
happily during the war.”)110 The poem points to the wrongness and/or
betrayal of living happily amidst great suffering (perhaps even at the 
expense of another’s suffering). It concerns the failure to respond 
emotionally where one has political, or moral reasons to do so. This raises
an additional series of questions concerning how one’s range of emotional
concern might be extended, and the ways in which they might be 
extended in line with one’s political, ethical or justice-based
commitments? How utilitarian might this calculation be? Thinking about
the role emotions might play in the service of justice raises a series of 
subtle questions about emotions and truth or knowledge claims, and 
about the rationality of emotions themselves. 
Within the field of the philosophy of emotion, it is a long-abandoned 
view that emotions are beyond judgement, or political evaluation, though 
this is often the stated rationale for the call to disentangle legal reasoning
from emotion. Emotions are, however, evaluative in at least two senses. 
Emotions are object-directed, which means that facts or new information
about an object can work to revise an emotional state.111 Emotions are also
comprised of cognitive judgements reflecting in some sense what the 
person experiencing the emotion considers important, which opens them 
up to probing questions about the status of the values underlying those 
emotional concerns. It is with respect to the former that perspectival 
understandings of law can work to illustrate how certain histories, 
experiences, and proximity to the impact of a legal regime serve to lend a 
credibility, weight, or rationality to certain emotional expressions over 
(Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); White, “On Emotions and the Politics of
Attention in Judicial Reasoning”; Paul Bloom, Against Empathy: The Case for Rational
Compassion (New York: Ecco, 2018); Sally Anne Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction
and Social Critique (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Miranda Fricker, Epistemic
Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
110 "We Lived Happily During the War" in Kaminsky, Deaf Republic.
111 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought; Solomon, The Passions.
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others.112 In a powerful debate over the political virtue of anger, Amia 
Srinivasan responds to Martha Nussbaum’s argument that anger is
politically unproductive and morally damaging by raising the history of
black feminists who have long defended the rationality, and psychic 
significance of anger, as a powerful means of acknowledging political
injustice.113 While truth and/or rationality claims about emotions can play 
foundational roles in political and justice-based arguments, it is also
worthwhile to explore the ways in which emotions can contribute to
political projects (perhaps via literature, aesthetics, communal 
movements, radically imagined futures etc.) without necessarily drawing
on the language of truth, rationality, or reason. 114 
We might also like to puzzle through standing assumptions about 
emotions and their relationship to knowledge and bodies. While the 
cognitive view of emotions tends to be preeminent (for the time being)
in the field of the philosophy of emotion, other philosophical conceptions
of emotion foreground their affective and bodily aspects. William James 
famously wrote of how emotions were felt first in the body – with old 
evolutionary structures of the brain trained to spur reactions like flight. 
These experiences (the widened pupil, the quickened heartbeat) are later 
processed into emotion words and experiences, such as fear, or shame. 
Jenefer Robinson’s account of emotions – of “emotions-as-process” -
similarly foregrounds the affective or physiological aspect of emotions. 
She writes that emotions consist of an initial affective appraisal of 
something that the agent considers important, and at this stage, “our 
emotional pathways are fast and ‘dirty’, emphasizing the situation as 
perceived in terms of one’s interests and desires.”115 Robinson suggests that
is useful to think of affective appraisals “as a kind of ‘meta-response’, 
evaluating in a rough and ready way” something in the internal or 
112 See e.g. Williams, “The Raw and the Half-Cooked”; Peggy Cooper Davis, “Responsive
Constitutionalism and the Idea of Dignity,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional
Law 11, no. 5 (2009): 1373; Jedediah Purdy, “Laundered Violence: Law and Protest in Durham,”
N+1, August 23, 2017, https://nplusonemag.com/online-only/online-only/laundered-violence/.
113 See Srinivasan, “On the Aptness of Anger”.
114 See e.g. Gabrielle Bellot, “Gabrielle Bellot on the Dreamy, Queer Beauty of On a Sunbeam,”
Literary Hub, May 28, 2019, https://lithub.com/gabrielle-bellot-on-the-dreamy-queer-beauty-
of-on-a-sunbeam/.
115 Robinson, Deeper than Reason.
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external environment that matters to the individual in question, which 
then precipitates a physiological response (slowed breathing, a shiver 
down the spine). The process ends with cognitive reflection, which layers
on social meaning. We are thinking creatures, and we think through 
(justify, correct, temper) our responses.116 
A final distinct but related question concerns the political value of 
what is captured by and through emotions? What are the affective aspects 
of solidarity? What is the difference between an emotion-soaked witness, 
and voyeurism? Are there material, political, legal, constitutional
prerequisites for feelings associated with solidarity, equality, or dignity?117 
What is the relationship between imagination and emotion?118 How 
might one study emotions in international law without falling into a sort 
of scholarly preciousness or dilettantism - grave errors each given the
long-running structural, colonial, material violence associated with the 
history of the field.119 How to guard against the wrong or betrayal of
drawing on the materials of international law to showcase one’s own
fineness of sensibility for reading or writing about the subject? How 
might we cut at the distinction between sentiment and sentimentality?120 
How might associations between emotions and virtue (or
fineness/sensibility/sensitivity) resist elitism, and contend with rule of law
concerns?121 
116 See e.g. Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure: And Other Essays (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002).
117 Rocio Lorca, “Punishing the Poor and the Limits of Legality,” Law, Culture and the
Humanities, July 23, 2018, 174387211878998, doi:10.1177/1743872118789985.
118 See e.g. Amaya and Del Mar, Virtue, Emotion, and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning.
119 This cutting criticism was raised in Christine Schwöbel-Patel’s lecture entitled, 
“Occupying’ Global Justice: Towards a Counter-Aesthetics of Marketised Global Justice” at
Osgoode Hall Law School on February 27, 2019. See also the forthcoming book, Christine 
Schwöbel-Patel, Marketing Global Justice: The Political Economy of International Criminal Law,
Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law 152 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2021).
120 . . See Catherine Z Elgin, “Impartiality and Legal Reasoning,” in Virtue, Emotion and
Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning, ed. Amalia Amaya and Maksymilian Del Mar (Hart
Publishing, 2020), doi:10.5040/9781509925162. Gerry Simpson locates this tension in the
practice of international law in “The Sentimental Life of International Law,” London Review of
International Law 3, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 3–29.
121 Elgin, “Impartiality and Legal Reasoning.”
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Conclusion 
The final poem in Kaminsky’s book sees the fictionalized occupied 
town left by the narrator for present day America. The poem is entitled, 
“In a Time of Peace”122, a section of which reads, “Ours is a country in 
which a boy shot by police lies on the pavement/for hours./ We see in his 
open mouth/ the nakedness/ of the whole nation./ We watch. Watch/ 
others watch. / The body of a boy lies on the pavement exactly like the 
body of a boy.” The poem, as I understand it, is referring to the police 
shooting of an unarmed black teenager Michael Brown, and the grave 
dishonour, and disregard, shown from the act of letting his lifeless body
lie on the pavement for hours, as the surrounding community gathered 
to give witness. Brown is not mentioned by name in the poem, nor his
town of Ferguson, Missouri. As one reads the poem, the reference is
known, or not known, and one final question for this chapter is what 
turns on this? It raises a question, long grappled with in the study of the 
history of political thought (and so too with respect to the history of the 
philosophy of mind and knowledge), which is, how much context and 
detail is required for understanding? We might ask here after the role of 
detail in constructing affect. What is it necessary to know to share in the 
rage and mourning called for by allusion to the killing in the poem? What
details impact the shape of this rage and this mourning? Or the duration 
of this rage and this mourning? What is lost in broad comparative work?
What is gained? 
This chapter represents only a first effort at generating a series of 
questions that seem invariably raised by any study of emotions in the 
territories of international law. Many of these are overwhelmingly large, 
implicating whole systems of knowledge, philosophies of action, theories
of history, theories of human nature, and so on. Nevertheless, we must 
ask them as our answers to these questions, however buried or explicit, set
our terms, and frames, and associations for the research that follows.
122 Kaminsky, Deaf Republic.
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